UDK 28-1
Dokazivanje i potvrđivanje religijskih vjerovanja i naučavanja racionalnim dokazima ima dugu prošlost među filozofima religije i teolozima. Ovaj pristup smatra da vjerovanje u religijska načela i naučavanja zahtijeva njihovo dokazivanje i potvrđivanje racionalnim argumentima. Mnogo je kritika upućeno u vezi s utemeljenošću ovog pristupa, njegove neupotrebljivosti, te u pogledu onoga što je već urađeno s ovakvim pristupom. Ovaj tekst se bavi razmatranjem i kritiziranjem nastojanja nekih filozofa religije da iznesu različite argumente među racionalnim argumentima (deduktivne i induktivne) u dokazivanju religijskih naučavanja.
The value of the cumulative argument in proving the existence of God
Abstract
Proving and confirming religious beliefs and teachings by rational proofs has a long tradition among philosophers of religion and theologians. This approach holds that believing in religious principles and teachings requires their proof and confirmation by rational arguments. Many criticisms has been expressed concerning the justification of this approach, its inapplicability and what has already been achieved with this approach. This paper analyzes and criticizes the efforts of some philosophers of religion to present different arguments among rational arguments (deductive and inductive) in proving religious teachings.
Keywords: the cumulative argument, the rational argument for the existence of God, the philosophy of religion, religious teachings
[tags]